The Stern-Druckman inquiry has reached conclusions that may also apply to knowledge of conflict resolution techniques. First, the vast majority of proposals (approximately 80) have not been tested by the surprising events. These conclusions of the historical experiment have therefore remained as good as before. Second, most of the proposals that were tested as a result of events were supported by the events that occurred. This knowledge has also become unchanged by the shift of the global system. Third, however, none of the most critical events of 1989 were mentioned in any of the proposals. The available knowledge of the international system had virtually nothing to say about the conditions under which an international epidemic of democratization would break out, or a great empire would liquidate peacefully, or a new historical era would open without a war of great power. Thus, although much of what existed before 1989 as knowledge was still reliable knowledge after that period, much of the situation, even with the perfect diagnosis of a situation, cannot expect general knowledge to provide measurement revenue for several reasons. First of all, this type of knowledge will never be firmly established in the kind of law of physics. On the one hand, human actors may object to laws that must govern their own behaviour; for others, global conditions are constantly changing in a way that can overturn the conclusions of past experience.
Second, the many trade-offs in each decision-making situation make general knowledge an imperfect guide to action. Sometimes not all aspects of success can be achieved at once and decisions must be made. Sometimes the results of conflict resolution are not the only ones that are relevant to practitioners who must then balance these results with other desired outcomes (. B, for example, for government officials, continued support from the national government). In the world of national interests, the main methods of managing international conflicts have been the possibilities of traditional diplomatic, military and economic influence, ranging from the threat or the use of force. These instruments of power policy – the same instruments used by states to engage in international conflicts – were the most important used in conflict management efforts.2 Thus, states or coalitions of states have attempted to prevent or mitigate violence through threats of armed violence (deterrence, forced diplomacy, defence alliances such as NATO); economic sanctions and other tangible non-military threats and sanctions, such as the withdrawal of foreign aid. B; and direct military force to establish demilitarized zones. States have also been sensitive to the fragile balance of nuclear energy, which could be jeopardized by this type of coercive diplomacy. This is why they looked for safety systems (see Jervis, 1983) that provided standards designed to reduce the risk of escalation. Implicit understandings of the new global conditions validate some past conflict resolution practices, which can now be defined and designed more precisely and bring to the attention of certain techniques that have not been taken very seriously by diplomats in the recent past.