Schwarz also distinguished between the “functional” and “political” aspects of the dispute. In his correspondence with the Indian and Pakistani leaders, Black claimed that the most realistic could be resolved if the functional aspects of differences of opinion were negotiated outside of political considerations. He imagined a group that looked at how best to exploit the waters of the Indus Basin, apart from questions of historical rights or attributions. Lilienthal`s idea was welcomed by officials at the World Bank (then the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and then by the Indian and Pakistani authorities. Eugene R. Black, then president of the World Bank, told Lilienthal that his proposal “makes a big sense.” Black wrote that the bank was interested in the economic progress of both countries and feared that the dispute over the industry was only a serious obstacle to this development. India`s previous objections to third-party arbitration were corrected by the Bank`s insistence that it would not decide on the dispute, but that it would work as a channel to reach an agreement. [38] It was recognized that the issue of water distribution in the De l`Indus hydric system should be resolved as soon as possible; in 1948, water rights in the river system were at the heart of an Indo-Pakistani water dispute. Since the ratification of the treaty in 1960, despite several military conflicts, India and Pakistan have not fought any more water wars. Most disputes and disputes have been settled through legal procedures under the Treaty. [11] The Indus Water Treaty is now considered one of the most effective water-sharing efforts in the world, although analysts acknowledge the need to update some technical specifications and expand the scope of the climate change agreement.
[12] [13] However, negotiations quickly came to a halt and neither side was willing to compromise. In 1951, David Lilienthal, former director of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, traveled to the area to research articles he was to write for Colliers Magazine. He proposed that India and Pakistan work to conclude an agreement for the joint development and management of the Indus water system, possibly with advice and funding from the World Bank. Eugene Black, then president of the World Bank, agreed. On his proposal, engineers from each country formed a working group in which engineers provide advice to the World Bank. However, political considerations prevented even these technical discussions from reaching an agreement. In 1954, the World Bank proposed a solution to the impasse.
After six years of talks, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan signed the Indus Water Treaty in September 1960. India and Pakistan were on the brink of war for Kashmir. There did not seem to be any possibility of negotiating on this issue until tensions had eased. A way to reduce hostility… Focus on other important issues on which cooperation would be possible. Progress in these areas would foster a sense of community between the two nations that, over time, could lead to a settlement of Kashmir. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan jointly develop a programme to jointly develop and exploit the River System of the Indus Basin, on which both nations depended for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the indus and its tributaries could be manufactured in such a way as to provide the additional water needed by each country to increase food production.
In that article, I proposed that the World Bank could use its good offices to bring the parties to an agreement and help finance an industrial development programme. [37]:93 Blacks` hopes for a quick solution to the dispute over the indus were premature. . . .